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INTRODUCTION
Asset management, a distinctive component of segment for financial services and

products, has not attracted scholarly interest to the extent warranted by its significance and the
complexity of the issues it raises. In general, in an asset-management relationship an investor has
delegated discretion to a manager—the investor’s agent—to make decisions respecting securities
on the investor’s behalf, subject to limitations and objectives established in an investment
management agreement. Measuring the size of the industry requires many judgment calls, but a
reputable source reckons that, world-wide, asset managers had $121.8 trillion dollars under
management in 2011.1 As Liability of Asset Managers documents extensively, across a range of
jurisdictions, important issues raised by asset management are resolved differently, sometimes
strikingly so. This is so within the EU under the MiFID regime, and well as within major nonEU jurisdictions: Switzerland, Canada, and the United States.
It is also evident that regulation specific to asset management has not displaced general
law; general law—the law of agency (or representation), contract, and tort—shapes the content
of regulation and influences how questions are resolved, in particular when client’s portfolio
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suffers losses or the asset manager’s loyalty to the client is at issue. Additionally, the
jurisdictions covered by Liability of Asset Managers answer differently a series of questions
about relationships between regulation and managers’ civil liability (whether grounded in a
breach of duties imposed by regulation or by the general law), suggesting different answers to
the broader question whether regulation and civil liability should be understood as substitutes for
each other or as complements. The relationships between regulation and civil liability are
complex and are not resolved uniformly across jurisdictions, even EU jurisdictions subject to
MiFID.2
Even from my vantage point in the United States, the liability of asset managers cannot
be assessed without considering backdrop bodies of law.3 The relevant federal statute, the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, plus an extensive body of administrative rules issued by the
SEC under the Act, do not entirely occupy the field despite their long history and technical
complexity. To be sure, the precise definition of the actors covered by the Advisers Act is not
identical to MiFID’s definition of those engaged in ‘portfolio management’ of ‘financial
instruments’ because the Act encompasses investment advice given generally without
mentioning a particular security as well as advice about the selection of another adviser.4 On the

2

See D. Busch & D.A. DeMott, ‘Comparative Analysis of the Jurisdictions—The Impact
of Regulatory Frameworks on an Asset Manager’s Private Law Duties and Liability, in D. Busch
& D.A. DeMott, Liability of Asset Managers (OUP 2012)(hereinafter Liability of Asset
Managers).
3

See D.A. DeMott & A.B. Laby, ‘United States of America,’ in Liability of Asset
Managers ch. 13.
4

Compare Advisers Act, s 202(a)(11), 15 USC s 80b-(a)(11) with Markets in Financial
Instruments Directive 2004/39/EC of 21 April 2004, Title I, Art 4(1)(9)(hereinafter ‘MiFID’).

-2-

other hand, not all who manage investments in securities for others fall within the scope of the
Advisers Act; for one thing, the Act is limited to advice about ‘securities,’ which does not
include swaps, futures, and other instruments covered by MiFID’s definition of ‘financial
instrument’.5 Nonetheless, sufficient overlap suggests the relevance of experience in the United
States, in particular its combination of a long-enduring regulatory structure with elements that
evolve gradually. These include ongoing regulatory determinations, plus judicial decisions
applying the Advisers Act and the general law.
General law (and civil liability) aside for the moment, another striking feature of the
regulation of asset managers across jurisdictions is the lengthy menu of regulatory techniques in
use, albeit unevenly and with different emphases and styles. The remainder of this brief
Comment sketches some of these techniques and issues they raise, prefaced by a brief discussion
of goals and objectives in the regulation of asset managers.

II

REGULATORY OBJECTIVES AND TECHNIQUES

A.

Regulatory objectives
In general, and across jurisdictions, the reduction of agency costs is a central objective of

regulating asset managers. Such costs stem from divergent interests as between manager and
client.6 The fact of regulation acknowledges that asset management contracts may be inadequate
vehicles through which to reduce agency costs, that an asset manager’s interest in developing
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and preserving a good reputation may not resolve the consequences of divergent interests
between manager and client, and that the interests of asset managers as members of an industry
may fall short of aligning managers’ and clients’ interests. Separately, asset managers
intermediate information about the value of underlying investment assets as between managers’
clients and the issuers of investment securities. Asset managers filter information that issuers
generate and are a component force in securities pricing through decisions to buy and sell
securities.7 To the extent managers’ investment decisions are biased by conflicts of interest,
systemic concerns about the integrity of market pricing come into play beyond a manager’s
relationship with a particular client.
The regulation of asset managers may reflect additional commitments and objectives.
Regulation within the EU has been shaped by overarching commitments to stronger integration
of securities markets in Europe8 and a corollary commitment to achieving a level playing field
across EU jurisdictions for providers of financial services. This does not appear to be a dominant
regulatory objective in the United States and Canada. Additionally, although furthering legal
certainty is an underlying aspiration of contemporary regulation, in the United States and Canada
this objective co-exists with the consequences of federalism and the bottom-up development and
application of general legal principles, in Canada encompassing a civil-code jurisdiction
(Quebec) as well as provinces within the common-law tradition.9
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Distinct from the substance of regulatory commitments and techniques, how best to
assure compliance with regulation is an overarching question. Most likely complex regulatory
systems, to the extent they succeed, do so not on the ex ante basis of architectural design, but
because the targets of regulation participate in achieving the regulatory mission.10 Whether it
occurs through command-and-control regulation or through principles-based regulation that
relies on individual firms and industry-based groups, compliance is an inescapable (and large)
question about the effectiveness of regulation.11
B.

Regulatory techniques
Although asset managers are subject to similar types of regulation in many jurisdiction,

the fact of diversity in regulatory technique is striking, as is the complementarity among
regulatory techniques. For example, in Switzerland, unquestionably a significant jurisdiction,
asset management as such is not a regulated financial service.12 However, industry-based selfregulation is important,13 in particular because clients with discretionarily-managed assets do not
have access to investment in hedge funds and the like unless their manager has the status of a
bank or securities dealer or is a member of a self-regulatory organization with a code of conduct
that binds its members and complies with requirements imposed by the Swiss Financial Market
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Supervisory Authority (FINMA).14
Regulation specific to asset managers tends to use some or all among a set of techniques,
which are: (1) mandated disclosure of information, in particular concerning the manager and the
terms under which a portfolio will be managed; (2) registration, licensing, and other
requirements that determine eligibility to provide management services; (3) self-regulation by
industry-based organizations; and (4) rules that structure the manager’s conduct of business,
including custody of client assets. Jurisdictions also differ in what may be termed the “style” of
regulation, in particular the character of enforcement by the regulator itself, but this brief
Comment does not explore this dimension of difference.
1.

Mandated disclosure of information
Given its central role in contemporary securities regulation, it is unsurprising that

regulation specific to asset managers requires disclosure by the manager of specified information
to clients and prospective clients. MiFID, for example, requires that clients and potential clients
be provided with information in a standardized format appropriate to understanding the nature
and risks associated with investment services,15 with differences depending on whether a client
or potential client is a retail investor or a professional.16 For retail clients, this includes
information about the method and frequency with which portfolio holdings will be valued,
details of any delegation of discretionary management authority, any benchmark for portfolio
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performance, and the types of financial instruments to be included in the portfolio.17 In the
United States, disclosure of information is the primary duty imposed on investment advisers by
the Advisers Act.18 Advisers are subject to specific disclosure requirements and, more generally,
to a general duty of disclosure that encompasses conflicts of interest as between the adviser and
its client, even when the adviser believes the conflict does not affect its recommendations or
decisions.19
How extensively or heavily a regulatory system should rely on required disclosure is a
noticeable difference among jurisdictions, creating a spectrum on which the United States has
long emphasized disclosure as a preferred technique of regulation. Indeed, in the evolution of
MiFID II, the European Commission proposed a prohibition on the payment of commissions to
an investment adviser when the adviser is designated as an independent adviser.20 Whether or not
(and in what form) the prohibition may survive into the final version of MiFID II, 21 the choices
of regulatory technique lie among required disclosure of commissions, versus their prohibition,
versus their treatment in the present MiFID regime, in which commissions may be accepted if
they are ‘value-adding,’ enhancing service to the client.22
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The universality of disclosure requirements may tend to slight questions about the
efficacy of disclosure in enabling clients to make informed choices. Academic researchers using
the methodology of experimental economics find that disclosure of conflicts of interest by
financial advisers has paradoxical results.23 On the one hand, if an adviser discloses a conflict—
in the study a payoff based on the amount a client invests—clients fail to discount enough for the
adviser’s bias. This may be because disclosure induces greater confidence in the adviser,
especially when the disclosure appears to be made voluntarily, or because clients find it hard to
know how much to discount a recommendation and find it hard to unlearn what they previously
believed. On the other hand, advisers required to disclose conflicts seemed to give advice that
was more biased or exaggerated, perhaps because the disclosure requirement conferred a ‘moral
license’24 to bias advice and to disclose conflicts in a perfunctory manner. To be sure, such
studies are necessarily limited by the methodologies used but the results may warrant caution
about the consequences of mandated disclosure.
2.

Licensing, registration, and other eligibility requirements
With the exception of Switzerland as noted above, asset managers generally must comply

with a licensing or registration requirement administered by a public regulatory authority, unless
the manager is exempt from the requirement. The content of these requirements differs. MiFID
requires prior authorization to perform investment management services, membership in a client
compensation scheme, and compliance with stated minimum capital requirements. For example,
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in England, Wales, and Scotland, a firm that engages in only investment management is subject
to an initial capital requirement of € 50,000, which becomes € 125,000 when the firm is
permitted by clients to hold their assets.25 The processes for prior authorization differ within
MiFID jurisdictions. In Ireland, for example, to receive authorization a prospective asset
manager must have an in-person meeting with personnel of the Central Bank and then submit
extensive information; the Bank must be satisfied, inter alia. as to the probity and competence of
each of an applicant’s directors and senior personnel.26 In Canada, registration and licensing is a
provincial-level activity; in Ontario, individuals within the regulatory category of portfolio
managers must have worked for at least a minimum period of time in the industry and must hold
a designation as a CFA (Chartered Financial Analyst), unless the provincial regulator grants an
individual exemption.27
In striking contrast, registration as an investment adviser in the United States requires
(unless the adviser is exempt) only compliance with disclosure requirements imposed by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), both to prospective clients through a brochure
covering eighteen items prescribed by the SEC and to the SEC through completion of a form.28
Although registration thus does not require that a prospective adviser satisfy initial capital
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requirements, belong to an investor compensation scheme,29 or meet experience and credential
requirements comparable to those in Ontario, registration is not without consequences. Most
notably, registration subjects an adviser to examination by the SEC.30 Moreover, the registration
form filed with the SEC—Form ADV—enters a publicly-accessible database. One indication of
the potential significance of adviser registration forms is the recent media attention focused on
directors of hedge funds, which became (unless exempt) subject to the requirement to register as
advisers as a consequence of the Dodd-Frank legislation.31 Alert to this new source of data, the
New York Times analyzed thousands of hedge-fund adviser filings and determined that many
directors of funds organized in the Cayman Islands sit on the boards of twenty-four or more
funds with different managers, while some directors hold more than one hundred directorships in
Caymans-based funds.32 Some firms that supply directors also furnish legal services to funds, but
industry sources cite a move toward greater independence and separation of services, all likely
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heightened by the increased scrutiny of fund governance now enabled by adviser registration. 33
3.

Industry-based self-regulation
The extent and status of self-regulation through industry-based organizations differ

markedly among jurisdictions. Likewise, external assessments of the potential strengths and
pitfalls of self-regulation are far from unanimous. Supporters emphasize the superior information
and responsiveness of industry-based regulation, while critics see mostly defensive and grudging
efforts to hold government at bay.34 In Switzerland, as explained above, self-regulatory
organizations (SROs) constitute a substantial component of the regulation of asset managers. At
the opposite end of this spectrum, industry-based groups may represent the interests of their
members but play no regulatory role. For example, the Luxembourg Bankers’ Association (the
ABBL) includes as members most banks, financial institutions, and financial professionals but
the ABBL has no self-regulatory functions.35
One potential strength of industry-based regulation is its ability, if effective, to expand
the reach of under-resourced and over-stretched public regulators. In the United States, the
current question is whether SROs might serve as vehicles for enforcing regulatory rules, in
particular by examining member firms to assess compliance, given the SEC’s limited capacity to
examine the population of 11,000 advisers registered with it.36 Investment advisers have not been
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subject by statute to an SRO, unlike broker-dealers; in response to a legislative mandate under
Dodd-Frank, the SEC has recommended that Congress consider whether one or more SROs
should examine advisers and whether the SRO for broker-dealers (the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority or FINRA) should examine advisers who are dually-registered as brokerdealers for compliance with the Advisers Act.37 Legislation currently pending in Congress would
require an SRO for advisers,38 with FINRA assumed to be the lead candidate and disputes
concerning projected costs.39 Much of this debate is overshadowed by Bernard Madoff’s longrunning Ponzi scheme, which defrauded investors of billions of dollars and eluded detection for
many years.40
4.

Conduct of business rules, in particular custody of client assets
Jurisdictions in which investment managers are subject to specific regulation impose

requirements applicable to the manager’s conduct of its business. MiFID, for example,
establishes a general obligation of acting honestly, fairly and professionally in accord with
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clients’ best interests and in accord with a set of general principles.41 Many requirements operate
more specifically, including tests requisite to fulfilling the ‘know-your-customer’ duties.42
Jurisdictions—including those subject to MiFID—differ significantly in their treatment
of a manager’s custody (or safeguarding) of clients’ financial assets. Custody raises important
issues because a manager’s physical custody of, or control over, assets belonging to a client
exposes the client to evident risks. The client may become subject to claims of the manager’s
own creditors; inadequate record-keeping may create confusion over asset ownership; the risk of
conversion and other forms of misappropriation is evident; and managers’ self-custody of client
assets can facilitate fraudulent schemes that require fictitious statements of assets in clients’
portfolios. To be sure, these risks can also arise when a third party holds clients’ assets, and
third-party custody may be more costly. Thus, perhaps it is unsurprising that jurisdictions
diverge on the regulation of custody arrangements and, apart from formal regulation, in
customary practices relevant to custody.
MiFID permits asset managers to hold financial instruments and funds that belong to
clients, subject to a requirement that the manager make ‘adequate arrangements’ to safeguard
assets were the manager to become insolvent and to prevent its use of clients’ assets for its own
account without clients’ explicit consent.43 If the manager deposits client assets with a third
41
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party, the manager has a duty to select the depository with due care, skill, and diligence.
Likewise, in the United States, an investment adviser may have custody of clients’ financial
assets, subject to a complicated SEC rule.44 In general, and subject to exceptions, an adviser with
custody must agree that an independent public accountant may conduct a surprise examination.
Recent events in the United States illustrate the risks associated with control over clients’ assets,
even that falling short of technical custody. The failed futures-trading firm MF Global Holding
Ltd.—regulated not as an investment adviser but as a futures broker subject to the Commodities
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)—relied on an exemption from the categorical requirement
that it segregate customer assets from its own that applied to customers with non-US accounts In
the final desperate days before MF Global’s bankruptcy filing, some $1.6 billion of customer
monies went missing, with $175 million transferred to replenish an overdrawn bank account of
MF Global itself.45 But customers with non-US accounts claim that ‘they had no idea’ just how
vulnerable they were to the risks that the firm would use their assets to meet its own obligations
and that they would be treated so differently from customers with no investments outside the
United States.46 As a consequence, the entire futures industry came under a reputational black
cloud.47
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In contrast, the regulation implementing MiFID in Italy contains no rules concerning
managerial custody because custody of clients’ assets falls within the regulatory powers of the
Bank of Italy and is subject to its regulation.48 In Germany, only licensed banks may provide
custodial services,49 and in Switzerland independent asset managers may not hold cash or
securities accounts for customers. Separate from formal regulation, customary practice in a
particular financial market may shape how custody is structured. In Poland, for example, firms
that serve only as asset managers do not typically also serve as custodians of client’s assets
because the practice is that an a management client enters into a separate custody agreement with
a bank or a full-service brokerage firm.50
Finally, managerial custody of clients’ assets may combine high risks to the client with
the prospect that regulation prohibiting the practice would foreclose conduct by a small number
of managers that leads to liability. A categorical prohibition on such custody arrangements would
foreclose the need for the kinds of complex regulation discussed above. Perhaps the overall costs
of custody ultimately borne by clients would increase—perhaps—but it is important to remember
that enforcement in the wake of a manager’s abuse of custody is also costly. For example, to date
the trustee pursing assets on behalf of victims of the Madoff Ponzi scheme has distributed $ 1.1
billion (against $ 20 billion in total losses on the trustee’s determination) and is in a legal
position to distribute billions more.51 But to accomplish this result, the trustee and his law firm
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have charged more than $270 million in fees.52
III

CONCLUSION
As this brief Comment illustrates, many issues concerning the regulation of asset

managers are challenging at many levels. Additionally, many are highly topical. The variety of
regulatory techniques sketched in the Comment may imply that asset management raises issues
distinct to particular jurisdictions, to which the jurisdiction responds through a distinctive set of
regulatory choices.
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